Circuit-to-Circuit Attacks in SoCs via Trojan-Infected IEEE 1687 Test Infrastructure - Circuits Intégrés Numériques et Analogiques Accéder directement au contenu
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2022

Circuit-to-Circuit Attacks in SoCs via Trojan-Infected IEEE 1687 Test Infrastructure

Résumé

We demonstrate a Hardware Trojan (HT)-based circuit-to-circuit attack mechanism in the context of Systemson-Chip (SoCs). The HT trigger is hidden inside the attacking circuit and the HT payload travels from the attacking circuit to the victim circuit via the test infrastructure. The common test infrastructure is configured accordingly by the HT so as to propagate the HT payload. We demonstrate the capability of this HT to perform a denial-of-service attack on an industrial Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) connected to a IEEE 1687 test infrastructure.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
forHAL_Circuit_to_Circuit_Attacks_via_Trojan_Infected_Test_Infrastructure.pdf (1.05 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03738329 , version 1 (26-07-2022)

Identifiants

Citer

Michele Portolan, Antonios Pavlidis, Giorgio Di Natale, Eric Faehn, Haralampos-G. Stratigopoulos. Circuit-to-Circuit Attacks in SoCs via Trojan-Infected IEEE 1687 Test Infrastructure. 2022 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC), Sep 2022, Anaheim, CA, United States. pp.539-543, ⟨10.1109/ITC50671.2022.00068⟩. ⟨hal-03738329⟩
75 Consultations
81 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More